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Abstract : This paper presents a survey of methods of regulations with
focus on pollution abatement and of various approaches to the issue of mea-
suring quantities such as the marginal benefit of improved health that are
crucial in view of implementing the regulation. Since pollution is a public
bad, in general the eﬃcient level of pollution can only be reached by way of
some sort of public intervention. The paper’s focus is on so-called market-
based mechanisms, which in turn are classified into price-based mechanisms
(pollution taxes) and quantity-based mechanisms (tradeable permits). The
basic framework for addressing the comparison between the two types of
mechanisms is Weitzman (1974). In order to actually choose between regu-
lation methods and to eventually implement chosen methods, estimates are
needed of some crucial quantities, in particular of marginal costs and benefits
of pollution abatement. The most problematic one is of course marginal ben-
efit. Therefore the paper considers various approaches to the measurement
of marginal benefits.
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1 Pollution Regulation to Protect Human Health
Human health problems related to environmental degradation and use of
natural resources are potentially serious in many parts of the developed and
developing world alike. These problems may have important economic reper-
cussions: they may generate additional costs for patients and the social wel-
fare system, they can lead to a loss of productivity and profits for firms and
they often result in a loss of income for individuals. Then, improving human
health through measures addressed at preventing or reducing environmental
pollution is a very important task for policy makers and government inter-
vention through regulation is necessary to control pollution.
[...there are to many people damaged by most emissions of
pollution for them to act as a single coordinated agent. Victims
of pollution damages have diﬀerent tastes, incomes, education so
that they cannot agree how much to control pollution. (This jus-
tifies) government intervention in absence of which the market
would fail to abate emissions...] (Mendelsohn, 2002).
Government intervention to protect human health means regulations through
standards or other mechanisms of pollution control. In the last decades, much
of the debate on instruments for government regulation has centered on the
use of market-based incentives (MBI) mechanisms as opposed to command
and control approaches (CAC). In CAC regulatory mechanism, the regulator
usually specifies a technology or emission standards with the aim of control-
ling the substances that can contribute to pollution (Ellerman, 2005). The
problem with CAC mechanisms is that they do not abate pollution eﬃciently.
The marginal cost of control is high for some firms and low for others, since
a such as uniform regulations treat all firms the same way. Moreover, com-
mand and control approaches do not encourage polluters to do any better
than the law demands (Gangadharan and Duke, 2001).
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Among economists there is near unanimity in preferring market-based
incentives since they encourage firms to abate pollution more eﬃciently.
Among MBIs, the basic choice faced by policy makers concerns price-based
versus quantity-based instruments, or in other words, pollution taxes3 and
tradeable permits4. To establish a basis for comparison among these policy
instruments, the traditional literature often relies on the following assump-
tions:
- the same amount of emissions from diﬀerent sources have equal external
costs;
- the literature ignores possible interactions with other markets;
- there is no uncertainty about the costs and the benefits of pollution
control;
- a competitive structure prevails.
In this setting, it is easy to show that emission taxes and tradable permits
are equivalent: the two approaches will lead to the same outcome that is the
optimal level of emissions at minimum cost. In a world of perfect knowledge,
marketable permits are in principle a fully equivalent alternative to unit
taxes. Instead of setting the proper tax and obtaining the eﬃcient quantity of
emissions as a result, regulator could issue emissions permits. This symmetry
between taxes and tradable permits, however, is critically dependent upon
the assumption of perfect knowledge. In a setting of imperfect information
concerning the marginal benefit and cost function, the outcomes under the
3The concept of pollution tax was developed by the British economist Arthur Pigou,
in “The Economics of Welfare” (1920). The term pollution taxes otherwise known as
externality taxes or Pigouvian taxes, by definition refers to a tax used to correct the
misallocation of estimated damage.
4The term tradable permit was developed in the pioneering work of Dales (1968).
Dales proposed a market of tradable permits as solution to pollution problems in which
the government grants pollution rights, that should be tradable for a certain period , and
in which government acts as broker for the trade monitoring the system.
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two approaches can diﬀer in important ways. When there is uncertainty
either about the marginal benefits and the marginal costs the optimal level
of emissions will typically not be achieved, and the goal of regulator than
becomes to minimize eﬃciency losses (Cropper and Oates, 1992).
The choice between quantity regulation and price regulation in terms of
economic eﬃciency under imperfect information has been shown repeatedly
in the pollution control literature. The classic article in this area is Weitzman
(1974)5. He assumed linear marginal costs and uncertainty about the level
of the marginal costs and benefits (not their slopes). Under these assump-
tions he reaches four main conclusions. Firstly, under full information it does
not matter whether taxes or individual permits are used. Both instruments
secure a first best optimum. Secondly, an error in estimating the benefits
function has adverse eﬀects on welfare but does not favor one policy instru-
ment over the other: the eﬃciency losses will be exactly the same for the
emission tax as the tradable permits system. Thirdly, if there is uncertainty
about costs, emission tax is preferred over quantity regulation if the marginal
costs are steeper than the marginal benefits function. Finally, transferable
permits are preferred over taxes in the case of imperfect information about
costs if the marginal benefits function is steeper than the marginal costs
function. These results can be summarized as follows:
5 ≈ σ
2
C (B” + C”)
2C”2
(1)
where 5 denotes the relative advantage of taxes over tradable permits mea-
sured in terms of welfare. If 5 > 0 taxes are preferred over quantities reg-
ulation; while 5 < 0 implies that tradeable permits is preferred over taxes.
B” denotes the marginal benefits slope (with B” > 0) while C” denotes the
curvature of marginal cost ( with C” > 0). σ2C represents the uncertainty on
5Weitzman did not prescribe exact types of price or quantity instruments, but many
authors see the issue as binary choice problem between taxes and a quantity-based regime
of tradeable permits.
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the cost function6, while the sign ≈ is used to denote ”a local approximation”
in the traditional Taylor theorem sense.
Subsequent contributions to this topic fall into two categories:
- Modifying the assumptions in Weitzman’s analysis (see Laﬀont, 1977;
Malcomson,1978; Stavins, 1996; Stranlund and Ben-Haim, 20067)
- Comparing policy tools other than an emission taxes and tradeable
permits ( see Yohe, 1977; Baumol and Oates, 1988; Mckitrick, 1997;
Williams, 2000; Montero, 2004).
Weitzman stresses that if the uncertainty on benefit and the uncertainty
on cost function are simultaneously present and benefit and cost function are
not independently distributed, the correct form of the above rule becomes:
5 ≈ σ
2
C (B” + C”)
2C”2
− σBC
C”
(2)
where σBC represents the covariance between benefits and costs. In order to
explore the full implications of the above rule, Stavins (1996) rewrite equation
(2) as:
5 ≈ σ
2
C
C”
µ
B”
2C”
+
1
2
− ρBC
σC
σB
¶
(3)
where ρBC is the correlation coeﬃcient between benefits and costs, while σB
and σC are respectively the standard deviation of benefits and costs. Based
on the equation (3) Stevins made the following important observations:
6The regulator perceives the cost function only as an estimate or approximation: C(q, θ)
where q denotes the emissions reduction and θ is a disturbance term or a random variable.
σ2C denotes the variance of costs; as σ2C shrinks to zero we move closer to the perfect
certainty case where in theory the two pollution regulation mechanisms perform equally
satisfactorily.
7Laﬀont (1977) examines modifications to the relative-slopes criterion when these are
also uncertain. Malcomson (1978) reexamine Weitzman’s rule when local linear approxi-
mations to the benefits and costs function are not appropriate. Stanlund and Ben-Haim
(2006) revisit Weitzman’s original work under Knightian uncertainty that is when uncer-
tainty cannot be modelled with known moments of probability distribution.
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1. when benefits and costs are not correlated, so that ρBC = 0, an error
in estimating the benefit function has adverse eﬀects on the welfare,
but the welfare loss does not diﬀer under taxes and tradable permits
regime;
2. Given
∂5
∂ (σB · σC) = −
ρBC
C”
, a positive correlation between benefits
and costs tends to favor tradeable permits over taxes while a positive
correlation tends to favor emission taxes.
3. Given
∂5
∂ρBC
= −σBσC
C”
, the greater the benefit or the cost uncertainty
and the lesser is the slope of the marginal cost function and the greater
is the influence of the correlation among benefits and costs on the choice
of the the best policy instrument to regulate pollution.
4. Theoretically these eﬀects can overwhelm the usual Weitzman’s relative-
slopes instrument recommendation.
5. The ”instrument neutrality” identified by the equality between marginal
benefits from pollution reduction and marginal abatement costs disap-
pears when benefits and costs are not independently distributed; in fact
by setting B” = −C” Stevins showed that:
5 = −σBC
C”
(4)
a positive correlation favor quantities based instruments (tradeable per-
mits) while if negative correlation between costs and benefits exists,
price instruments would be optimal. Stavins presents various scenarios
for statistical dependence between marginal benefits from environmen-
tal protection and marginal abatement costs. Many scenarios, however,
provide examples of positive correlation, suggesting that quantity in-
struments would be more attractive than otherwise. For instance, he
considered the weather as generator of stochastic shocks that produce
6
correlated impacts on marginal benefits and marginal costs of pollution
control:
[... the increased ultraviolet radiation that reaches the ground
level on sunny days means more ozone formation from oxides of
nitrogen and volatile organic compounds. Hence the marginal cost
of ambient concentration reduction (and risk reduction) would in-
crease. Of course, on beautiful sunny days, people are more likely
to be outside, exercising, and breathing the ozone-laden air; hence,
the marginal benefits of ambient-reduction would also increase,
yielding a positive correlation between the relevant marginal ben-
efits and marginal costs...] (Stavins, 1996).
Williams (2000, 2002) extends Weitzman’s (1974) paper by developing
a model of regulation of a group of pollution sources which investigates the
relative eﬃciency of three regulatory instruments when there is uncertainty
in the regulators’s knowledge of firms’ costs: an emission tax, fixed quotas
and tradeable permits. The general structure is similar to the model in
Weitzman, but diﬀers in two important respects: Williams’s paper compares
three pollution regulation instruments (tradeable permits, taxes and fixed
quotas), and considers the degree of substitutability between the pollution
sources. Williams results can be summarized as follows:
5TQ = B” (1− φ) + C”
2C”
µ
N − 1
N
¶P
i
σ2iC (5)
where, 5TQ denotes the relative advantage of tradeable permits over fixed
quotas in terms of welfare. N denotes the number of pollution sources
distinguished by location, time period or both, while φ represents the degree
of substitutability between the pollution sources. When abatement at one
location is a perfect substitute for abatement at any other location, as in the
case of globally mixed pollutants, tradable permits are preferred over fixed
emission quotas. However, when pollution is high localized and independent
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of emissions produced by other sources, tradable permits are dominated by
emission taxes or fixed quotas.
Montero (2004) considers the optimal policy instruments choice when the
regulator faces several information constraints: each firms have private infor-
mation about its emissions, abatement costs and production costs. Montero
develops a theoretical model for an industry of heterogeneous firms that pro-
duce output and undesirable by-products. The nature of Montero’s model
is similar to the one in Weitzman (1974) but with important diﬀerences: he
compares the performance of two quantity instruments ( tradeable permits
and fixed standards) and considers the eﬀect of cost heterogeneity across
firms on instrument performance. He concludes that tradeable permits is
preferred over CAC regulation when cost heterogeneity across firms is large,
while when heterogeneity disappears the advantage of permits reduces in fa-
vor of standards. He also examine the advantage of a hybrid policy that
optimally combines permits and standards.
Weitzman and the above described subsequent contributions fixed the
conditions under which each of this two instruments is to be preferred to
the other in a perfectly competitive equilibrium. However, many of major
polluters in the real world are large firms in non-competitive industries (oil
refineries, chemical companies, and auto manufacturers) where firms are not
price takers in their output markets. Buchanan (1969) called attention to
this issue by showing that the imposition of a Pigouvian tax may lead to a
contraction in output that under monopoly regime is below the social opti-
mum: a tax on a polluting monopolist will reduce the generation of external
damages, but it may also cause the firm to reduce further its output. Thus,
there is a trade-oﬀ between the two distortions, one due to the monopo-
listic underproduction and the other due to negative externalities. A tax
based only on negative externalities ignores the social cost of further output
contraction by a monopolist whose output is already below an optimal level.
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Barnett (1980) was the first to solve the problem of determining the sec-
ond best optimal emission level and the corresponding second best emission
tax to be imposed on a monopolist. He considers a polluter who produces
a single product output q and who discharges smoke s generating external
diseconomies E(s). He finds that a tax rate for unit of smoke discharged
which maximizes social welfare must be equal to:
T ∗ =
df (p)
dq
dq
dT
· q
∂s
∂q
dq
dT
+
∂s
∂w
dw
dT
+
dE(s)
ds
(6)
where f (q) is the industry demand curve, while w denotes resources devoted
to smoke treatment. He discusses two cases: one in which the only means to
abate the external diseconomies represented by smoke is reducing output ,
and the second case is one in which end-of-pipe treatment is the only means
of smoke abatement. In the first case, terms involving w disappear and an
optimal tax is given by:
T ∗ =
df (p)
dq
dq
dT
· q
∂s
∂q
dq
dT
+
dE(s)
ds
(7)
If the only means of smoke abatement is end-of-pipe treatment the polluter
responds to tax by changing w, than
dq
dT
is equal to zero and the optimal tax
is given by:
T ∗ =
dE(s)
ds
(8)
Only in this last case market structure is not relevant. But, market structure
becomes relevant for the more general case where both w and q vary with
T . Finally, Barnett reformulate equation 6 introducing the price elasticity of
demand µ = dq
df (p)
f (p)
q
and showing explicitly its role in determining the
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optimal second-best taxation:
T ∗ =
−df (p)|µ|
dq
dT
∂s
∂q
dq
dT
+
∂s
∂w
dw
dT
+
dE(s)
ds
(9)
He derives two main conclusions:
- when polluters are perfectly competitive µ approaches infinity, and the
value of the optimal tax rate approaches marginal external damage
dE(s)
ds
.
- when polluters are imperfectly competitive µ is finite, and second best
optimal tax rate may be less than marginal external damage to achieve
an optimal trade-oﬀ between the external diseconomies and the welfare
loss associated with monopoly output contraction.
The second best tax rate is equivalent to the combination of a Pigouvian
emission tax and a subsidy on production, thereby correcting both distor-
tions. Formally, the second-best tax rate can be negative if the social damage
associated to pollution is very small compared to the distortion due to the
market structure. The environmental problem becomes less significant and
the regulator sets a negative tax (i.e. a subsidy on pollution) to induce firms
to produce more.
Chen (1990) proposes another method for regulating monopolies and their
production. He assumes that the planning authority would provide to the
pollutant monopolist a subsidy equal to the expected value of the total benefit
from emission reduction. The pollutant monopolist chooses the abatement
level which maximizes profits given the subsidy and its own private infor-
mation on production costs. Chen compares, referring to Weitzman model,
the abatement subsidy with two other planning mechanisms: quantity based
instruments (tradable permits), price-based instruments (emissions taxes).
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He derives two expressions for the comparative advantage of the sub-
sidy relative to quantity based instruments and another for the comparative
advantage of the subsidy relative to price based instruments respectively:
5ST ≈ σ
2
C
2 (C”−B”)2
> 0 (10)
and
5SP ≈ σ
2
CB”2
2C” (C”−B”)2
> 0 (11)
where 5ST and 5SP denote respectively the relative advantage of subsidy
over tradeable permits and the relative advantage of subsidy over price reg-
ulation mechanism in terms of welfare. Not only the abatement subsidy
does dominate quantity based instruments , but also dominates price-based
instruments. Chen concludes that we have the best mechanism when pol-
lutant monopolist chooses the level of reduction in emission receiving, or
internalizing the social benefits of his abatement. Subsidies however are of-
ten politically and financially infeasible and might deter the adoption of new
abatement technology.
Instead, little work has been done to investigate emissions trading mar-
kets where one or more participants have market power. Much work has
been done on tradeable permits as mechanisms that may themselves influ-
ence the market structure since they may be more susceptible to strategic
behavior. The basic idea for the tradeable permits control is that firms will
trade quotas among themselves; such trading could continue until firms have
equal marginal abatement costs and there is no further incentive to trade. In
equilibrium, the price in such market should be equal to marginal abatement
costs of each of the firms. In practice, however, the transactions costs in
the market for permits might be high and this might reduce the number of
transactions and prevent marginal abatement costs from being fully equal-
ized. It is also possible that firms could behave in an anticompetitive fashion,
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for example hoarding permits in eﬀort to drive polluting competitors out of
business. (see Hahn, 1984; Misiolek and Elder, 1989; Mansur, 2006).
2 Implementation of Environmental Policy
While the theoretical literature has clarified the issue concerning the determi-
nation of the best policy instrument to regulate pollution and reduce health
pollution related damages, there has been less empirical work (see Kolstad,
19868; and Choi and Feinerman, 1995). Lack of appropriate data (as well
as empirical research evidence) makes it diﬃcult to quantify environmental
health impacts and pollution social costs; hence, the choice of environmental
instruments becomes more complicated than what would appear from the
theoretical results9.
8Kolstad (1986) was the first that empirically examined the fees vs. permits issue. He
evaluated policies to control sulphur emissions from power plants by creating a stochastic
model of regulatory design and industrial response for taxes and permits for air pollution
regulation. He found that if marginal benefits from reduced sulphur emissions were con-
stant a price instrument would be slightly preferable, but that a slight marginal benefits
slope would be enough to make permits the more desirable option.
9As to the environmental charges and taxes, for example, the lack of information on
the damage levels and problems related to their measurement constitute serious obstacles
to the practical implementation. Consider, for instance, taxes paid by road transport: in
addition to the morbidity and mortality caused by vehicular emissions, road traﬃc leads
to noise stress, loss of quality of life, water pollution etc. Often, road traﬃc damage is
greater than the additional tax paid by road transport. Then, road transport may not
pay for the social costs it generates. This may lead to a pattern of transport development
which may be accompanied by excessive impacts on the environment and health.
In response to these measurement obstacles, the literature has explored some second-
best approaches to policy designs which have appealing properties. Baumol and Oates
developed the “environmental charges and standards approach” in “The Theory of Envi-
ronmental Policy”. They suggested to first set a certain standard of pollution (emission,
air and water quality, etc.) and then, through a process of trial and error, derive which
level of taxes have proved to give certain outputs. Taxes would be set to achieve a certain
acceptable standard rather than being based on the “unknown value of marginal damage”.
They further argued that such an approach would not result in Pareto optimality but that
the
[..use of unit taxes to achieve specified quality standard is the least-cost
method for the achievement of these targets...] Baumol and Oates (1988).
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One of the explanations for the gap in the empirical literature can be
found in the diﬃculties that analysts encounter in estimating marginal pol-
lution health damages or marginal benefits from reduced pollution. In fact,
while measuring control costs is relatively straightforward (market exists in
principle in which pollution control equipment can be bought, and such
equipment will reduce pollution by measurable levels 10), health damages
caused by an increase of ambient pollution or marginal benefits from a re-
duction in pollution concentration are much harder to measure. Many dif-
ficulties derive from the fact that individuals have diﬀerent susceptibilities
toward pollution: the eﬀects on health will vary across individuals due to
genetics, avoidance behavior, life-style and other several factors. Hence,
quantify exactly the extent of the health damages or health benefits de-
riving from increasing or decreasing pollution is a very hard task: we have to
calculate the associated changes in health outcomes by taking into account
that pollution could easily be correlated with other factors that may be just
as potent. Once we have determined health pollution damages or pollution
abatement benefits, we have to put a monetary value on them. However,
[...valuing health is obviously controversial because each person
may place a diﬀerent value on health. The problem facing society
with pollution control is that we must make decisions that are not
The regulator can also move towards the use of voluntary approach. The regulator
oﬀers the firm a contract based on a certain level of abatement eﬀort to achieve a certain
standard of pollution and the firm can accept or refuse; if firm refuses, the regulator will
impose an emission charge that is a fee levied on each unit of pollutant emitted. The
emission charge is not a Pigouvian tax strictly speaking; it is not based on the estimated
damage, but it can be considered a legitimate interpretation of the Pigouvian concept as
it is a tax implemented to combat environmental pollution circumventing the problem of
the damage level measurement.
10In order to compute and to evaluate producers’ marginal abatement costs, we should
to calculate shadow prices of pollution from the production technology that can be derived
from the estimated output distance function (Shepherd,1970; Fa¨re et al., 1993). Shadow
prices derived from estimated output distance function do not directly reflect the value
of abatement to society in terms of reduced morbidity but they could be compared to
independent calculations of such marginal benefits in order to guide regulatory policy.
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specific to each person but rather apply to us all. It is therefore
not surprising that there is such controversy about picking a single
value for health...] (Mendelsohn, 2002).
Concerning the quantification of health impacts scientists have performed
several epidemiological studies on the linkages between air pollution and
human health and have used the air pollution dose-response function11 to
estimate and evaluate the eﬀects of a change in environmental quality on
health12. Ostro (1994) presented the estimated health impact, for a given
11The dose-response function relates health eﬀects to air pollution concentrations and
other factors aﬀecting health.
12Many of these epidemiological studies has been conducted in developed countries and
used to estimate the eﬀects of air pollution on health in developing countries.
Ostro (1994), for instance, uses the available epidemiology literature dose-response func-
tions from the United States, Canada and Britain, to estimate the health impacts of con-
ventional air pollutants (particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, ozone) and
emissions of lead in Jakarta, Indonesia. Health eﬀects of air pollutants (such as premature
mortality, hospital visits and admissions, emergency room visits, restrictions in activity,
acute respiratory symptoms, acute bronchitis in children, asthma attacks, IQ loss, and
blood pressure changes.) are estimated by applying these functions to ambient air pollu-
tion leave.
Alberini and Krupnick (1997) use daily records from a diary-type epidemiologic study in
Taiwan to fit logit equations predicting the probability of experiencing acute respiratory
symptoms (and headaches) as a function of pollution and weather variables, individual
characteristics, and health background and proxies for reporting eﬀects. They find that
the rate at which illnesses are reported follows the fluctuations in PM levels but remains
unaﬀected by ozone concentrations. Their model predicts that the impact of the particu-
late matter eﬀects is very small. Moreover, illness rates tend to be poorly predicted when
the corresponding equation estimated for a similar study conducted in Los Angeles is used.
Alberini and Krupnick study stresses that great care must be taken in the application
of these method since dose-response transfer might give very misleading results. Firstly,
elderly are more sensitive to the life-shortening eﬀects of air pollution and in particular
to particulate matter. Extrapolations from the U. S. population to a population with a
much younger age structure would likely lead to an overestimate of the eﬀect of pollution
on premature mortality (Cropper, et al., 1997). Secondly, measured particulate matter
is a heterogeneous mixture of solids and liquid. Diﬀerences in the physical and chemi-
cal composition of particulate matter could lead to quite diﬀerent relationships between
measures of particulates and the health eﬀects of concern across countries (Ostro, et al.,
1996).
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type of health risk, as follows:
dHi = b · POPi · dA (12)
where: dHi denotes change in population health risk, bi denotes the slope
from dose-response curve13, POPi is population at risk, dA denotes the
change in air pollution. To complete the benefit or damage estimation for
health eﬀects, one would calculate the economic valuation Vi of this eﬀect
as well. Therefore the total change of the social value (dT ) of the health
eﬀects due to the change in environmental quality under consideration can
be represented by:
dT =
P
i
VidHi (13)
Even assuming that we can accurately measure health eﬀects dHi, putting
monetary values Vi on that eﬀects is rarely easy. The ability to place a mon-
etary value on the consequences of pollution on health remains the crucial
problem of the economic approach to human health problem related to en-
vironmental degradation (Hanemann, 1994).
Environmental economists have developed methodologies to measure the
value of pollution health damages; these methods can be grouped in two
broad categories. The first includes methods that measure only the loss of
direct income (lost wages and additional expenditures). These approaches do
not include discomfort, pain, losses in leisure, and other less-tangible impacts
to individual and family well-being, moreover, may seriously understate or
completely ignore the health costs of people who are not members of the
[...this approach neglects diﬀerences between the United States (and other
developed countries) and the target country in pollution levels, baseline health,
the age distribution of the population, medical care systems, sickleave policies,
and cultural factors that might aﬀect perceptions of illness and pollution and
behavioral responses...] (Alberini and Krupnick, 1997).
13The slope of dose-response function measures the percentage change in the health
outcome for a one unit change in ambient air pollution level.
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labor force. Therefore, these methods provide only the lower bound of the
social costs since tend to understate the total costs to individuals. The
second category is based on the willingness to pay (WTP) of some economic
agents for avoiding pollution health damages. Willingness to pay reflects the
individual’s preferences and can be interpreted as a monetary measure of
health damage.
In addition, following the conventional economic practice, we distinguish
these methodologies on the basis of whether their primary focus concerns
respectively nonfatal illness or rather death (or more specifically the change
in the conditional probability of dying at each age, for an identified group of
individuals at risk).
2.1 The Economic Value of Morbidity
Models that describe what an individual would pay to avoid illness associated
to pollution are, by now, well established in the literature (Berger et al. 1987;
Harrington and Portney, 1987; Cropper and Freeman, 1991). We start by
sketching Berger et al.’s (1987) model in order to provide a framework for
interpreting individuals’ willingness to pay. Then, we critically review the
methods and the research eﬀorts that have been devoted to estimating the
willingness to pay for reduced morbidity (see also Dickie and Gerking, 2002).
Berger et al. (1987), assume that a person’s utility depends on the con-
sumption of goods and services and the state of health:
U = U(c, q) (14)
where U is utility, C is consumption and q is a vector of health characteristics.
Individuals, however, do not know their health status with certainty . The
probability of enjoying good health is influenced by choosing one’s life-style,
thus making better and worse health status more or less probable, and by
using medical advice, pharmaceuticals, hospital treatment, etc. Although
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one’s current health status certainly provides some information about the
likelihood of future health outcomes, the risk of getting a disease may also
depend on other factors such as pollution exposure, smoking history, which
are more or less independent of one’s observable health state. Berger et al.
(1987) assume that the probability density function for health status is:
h (q;X,E) (15)
where X is preventive expenditure and E is any exogenous shift such as
environmental quality change. They reasonable assume that the chances of
survival can be expressed as function of health characteristics:
p = p (q) (16)
In addition, they assume that health is a matter only of absence or presence of
a deleterious condition and the density function h (q;X,E) is discrete rather
than continuos, with q = 1 if individuals will enjoy good health and q = 0
otherwise, thus:
h (q;X,E) = H (X,E) if q = 0
h (q;X,E) = (1−H (X,E) ) if q = 1
(17)
where H (X,E) denotes the probability of contracting the disease. Berger
et al. (1987) assume that a person will choose preventive expenditure X in
order to maximize the expected value of utility:
max E (U) = U0P0 (1−H) + U1P1H
subject to M = C +X + Z
(18)
whereM is the income, U0 = U (M −X, 0) is the utility if free of the disease;
U0 = U (M −X − Z, 1) is the utility with the disease (where Z is the cost of
illness that reduces consumption without providing utility). P0 denotes the
probability of survival if the individual is free from disease while P1 denotes
17
the probability of survival with disease.
From the above maximization problem Berger et al. (1987) derive a
person’s WTP for an exogenous reduction of the concentration of pollution.
WTP can be defined as a change in income that would be required to keep
the expected utility constant when there is an exogenous change. Berger et
al. express WTP as sum of two terms:
−dM/dE = − [(U0P0 − U1P1) /λ] (dH/dE)− (dX/dE) (19)
the first term is the monetary value of the expected diﬀerences of the ex-
pected utilities between being healthy and ill by the change in health risk.
The second term denotes the change in preventive expenditure due to an
exogenous change in the environment. Finally, λ = U 00P0 (1−H) + U 01P1H
and can be interpreted as the marginal utility of income.
Referring to the model above, Berger et al. (1987) explore two tech-
niques aimed at measuring WTP: the cost-of- illness (COI) approach and
the preventive expenditures (or averting expenditure ) approach, that we
review below.
The cost-of- illness (COI) approach is often used to value the cost of
pollution related to morbidity. COI measures any loss of earnings resulting
from illness (direct costs), medical costs such as for doctors, hospital visits
or days, and medication, and any other related out-of-pocket expenses (indi-
rect costs) (see Hodgson and Meiners,1982 for a complete description of the
methodology).
A key criticism to COI approach has been that it fails to take into account
individuals’ preferences, disutility from illness (Harrington and Portney, 1987),
averting behavior and averting expenditure (Cournat and Porter, 1981). This
criticism is supported by the equation 19 that consists in two terms: a utility
term which reflects the cost of illness and a second term reflecting preven-
tive expenditure. Only if preventive expenditure does not exist or does not
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change with changes in environment (dX/dE = 0) or, in a less plausible
case, if health status does not aﬀect directly the individual utility function,
equation 19 collapses to the first term and COI can be considered a measure
of individuals’ WTP.
In a similar model to the one presented above, Cropper and Freeman
(1991) show that willingness to pay can be expressed as the product of the
slope of a dose-response relationship times the marginal value of illness. But,
since the marginal value of illness includes not only the loss in productivity
and out-of-pocket expenditure but also pain and suﬀering, defensive expendi-
ture, and loss in leisure time, it is likely to be higher than the COI measure.
Hence, COI gives only a lower bound on willingness to pay (see also Dickie
and Gerking, 2002).
The preventive expenditures (or averting expenditure) approach assumes
that the link between environmental quality and health damages is aﬀected
by many human choices. In Berger et al. (1987) these choices are represented
by consumption of X, which can be defined in several ways such as: whether
to exercise on a day with high ozone level or to install an air filter or to buy
bottled water. The preventive expenditure approach infers the minimum
amount people are willing to pay to reduce health risks through the amounts
people living in polluted areas spend on averting measures: for instance, ex-
penditures on air filters or bottled water can be used to infer the minimum
value people are willing to pay to avoid respectively respiratory or water-
borne diseases. This approach has received little attention in environmental
literature since it presents many limitations (see Courant and Porter,1981).
Firstly, referring again to the equation 19, we can observe that preventive
expenditure represents only a lower bound of and individual’s WTP since it
does not consider explicitly the cost of illness. In addition, averting measures
may be diﬃcult to define for diﬀerent types of pollution.
Abdalla et al. (1992) use the averting expenditure method for valuing
environmental improvements and for approximating the economic costs of
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groundwater degradation to households in a southeastern Pennsylvania com-
munity. The decisions included in their study to test for averting behavior
were: increased bottled water purchases among households buying it prior to
the contamination, bottled water purchases by new buyers, installing home
water treatment systems, hauling water from alternate sources and boiling
water. The survey was conducted by mail and respondents were asked to
report only those actions taken as a specific response to groundwater con-
tamination. Their findings, obtained trough a logit specification, indicate
that household’s knowledge of contamination, perception of risk and pres-
ence of children determine whether they undertake averting actions and that
their expenditure levels are higher if young children are present. Bresnahun
et al. (1997) use panel data consisting of repeated observations on 226 Los
Angeles area residents during 1985-86 to explain defensive responses to air
pollution using determinants predicted by an averting behavior model. Their
empirical results indicate that people who experience smog-related symptoms
spend significantly less time outdoors as ozone concentrations exceed the na-
tional standard. Many people also report making other behavioral changes
to avoid smoggy conditions and the propensity to do so appears to increase if
health symptoms are experienced. Other applications have investigated indi-
viduals’ eﬀort to reduce symptoms of air pollution exposure (Abrahams et al.
2000; Eiswerth et al. 2005). However most of these studies find it diﬃcult to
assign a cost to averting behaviors. There is no monetary price for many of
these actions and no compelling reason to use wage rate for increasing time
spent indoors since it may not be entirely lost.
Another method frequently used by the environmental economist for valu-
ing reduced morbidity is the contingent valuation method (CV). CV, first
proposed by Ciriacy-Wantrup (1947) and first applied by Davis (1963), is a
survey or questionnaire-based approach. This method can be thought of as
an attempt to directly measure willingness to pay (−dM/dE in the Berger
et al. model presented above). In contingent valuation methods, randomly
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selected samples from the general population are given information about a
particular problem. They are then presented with a hypothetical occurrence
such as a disaster and a policy action that ensures against a disaster; they
are then asked how much they would be willing to pay – for instance, in
extra utility fees, income taxes, or access fees – either to avoid a negative
occurrence or bring about a positive one. The actual format may take the
form of a direct question (”how much?”) or it may be a bidding procedure (a
ranking of alternatives) or a referendum (yes/no) vote. Contingent valuation
studies are conducted as face-to-face interviews, telephone interviews, or mail
surveys. The face-to-face is the most expensive survey administration format
but is generally considered to be the best, especially if visual material needs
to be presented. Non-response bias is always a concern in all sampling de-
signs. In other words, people who do not respond have, on average, diﬀerent
values than people who do respond.
In principle, contingent valuation methods can be used to estimate the
economic value of anything, even if there is no observable behavior available
to deduce values through other means. Even though the technique requires
competent survey analysts to achieve defensible estimates, the nature of CV
studies and the results of CV studies are not diﬃcult to analyze and describe.
However, contingent valuation methods can be very expensive because of
the extensive pre-testing and survey work. Moreover, contingent valuation
methods suﬀer from a particular lack of accuracy: the presence of many biases
(these include the way in which questions are phrased, the socioeconomic
profile of respondents, the amount and type of information they are given
etc.).
More fundamentally, contingent valuation approach is based on the as-
sumption that individuals have well-defined preferences over all alternative
states of the world. This assumption, however, in unreasonable for children,
especially for infants. One approach to valuing the health eﬀects on chil-
dren is to make the assumption of ”parental sovereignty” and to value these
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impacts according to the parents’ willingness to pay for them (see Neidell,
2004). Freeman III (2000) however observes that
[... there is no clear reason for believing that parents’ willing-
ness to pay for changes that aﬀect their children will be equal to
the willingness to pay that the children would have for changes
that aﬀect their own well being. Some authors have noted that
parents do not always seem to be the best judges of what is good for
their children and sometimes engage in activities such as smoking
and drinking that actually harm their children...].
Even thought contingent evaluation presents these limitations, has great
flexibility, allowing valuation of a wider variety of non-market goods among
which individuals well-being.
Many environmental economist use this method to evaluate health ben-
efits from reducing pollution. For instance, Alberini et al. (1997) conduct
a contingent valuation survey in three cities of the Republic of China (Tai-
wan) to estimate willingness to pay to avoid a recurrence of the episode of
illness most recently experienced by the respondent. Alberini and Krup-
nik (2000) conduct a contingent valuation survey to estimate WTP to avoid
minor respiratory illnesses. Then they compare cost-of-illness (COI) and
willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates of the damages from minor respiratory
symptoms associated with air pollution using data from a study in Taiwan
in 1991-92.
Several studies have relied on a new approach in estimating the willing-
ness to pay for improved environmental quality by relying on the health pro-
duction approach first introduced by Grossman (1972) (see Kiiskinen, 2003).
Grossman interprets a person’s health as a capital stock that exogenously
deteriorates at an increasing rate with age. To counteract this health de-
terioration, he assumes that individuals invest a portion of their assets into
health production each period. By analyzing the decisions consumers make
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concerning the resources allocated to health production such as medical care,
time and a healthy life-style this method try to infer the value of health to
the consumers and derive estimate econometrically a measure of individual
willingness to pay for a reduction in pollution (Cropper, 1981; Gerking and
Stanley, 1986; Dickey and Gerking, 1991; Cropper and Freeman III, 1991).
Cropper (1981), for instance, extends Grossman’s model of health production
and health demand to incorporate pollution and estimates willingness to pay
for health risks related to an index of air pollutants. Gerking and Stanley
(1986) estimate willingness to pay for health risks related to ozone exposure.
They compute the value of a change in health by multiplying the cost of
preventive activity by an estimated ratio of marginal products of inputs in
the health production function. Harrington and Portney (1987) extended the
household production function model introduced by Grossman to examine
explicitly the relationships among willingness to pay for a reduction in pollu-
tion. Dickie and Gerking (1991) used a set of health symptoms in estimation
of functions hypothesized to be associated with air pollution. Cropper and
Freeman III (1991) develop a model of health production in which the health
outcome of interest is the number of hours during a time period that a person
spends in sickness. They show that willingness to pay can be expressed as
the product of the slope of a dose-response relationship times the marginal
value of sickness time.
The health production function approach suﬀers from an import limita-
tion too. The estimation of a health production function is frequently based
on instrumental variables since individual’s life-style and averting expendi-
ture/behavior inputs (that in the above model is represented by X) may be
endogenous. Construction of instruments, however, usually can be done in a
number of ways as theory often says little about how this problem should be
handled and variables used for this purpose are chose depending on what in-
formation is available together with judgement of the investigator. Diﬀerent
choices of instrumental variables typically can produce diﬀerent estimates of
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willingness to pay creating uncertainty.
2.2 The Economic Value of Mortality
Because some forms of pollution may increase mortality or shorten life ex-
pectancy, economists have to identify approaches for valuing life and the
benefits of lifesaving activities. Since death is a more easily measured out-
come than illness or injury (death is a one-dimensional event, whereas there
are varying degrees of illness and injury) these methods are easier to apply.
In estimating the value of lifesaving, economists have followed two schools
of thought. The first approach is based on measurements of the economic
productivity of the individual whose life is at risk. This is referred as hu-
man capital approach. The second approach is based on the individuals’
WTP to reduce the risk of death (Cropper and Freeman, 1991; Shepard and
Zeckhauser, 1982; Berger et al. 1994; Johansson,1995).
In the standard human capital approach the value of preserving a life Vi
(with reference to the equation 13) is equal to the discounted present value
of lifetime earnings lost due to premature mortality. Formally the present
value of lifetime earnings is given by:
Vi =
TX
t=j
qj,t (1 + r)j−t yt (20)
where qj,t is the probability of the individual surviving from age j to age
t, yt is the individual earnings at age t, r is discount rate and T is age at
retirement from labor force. This approach has been criticized on a number
of grounds: it considers individuals as units of human capital that produce
goods and services for society. The values calculated are dependent on the
age of death and on income, skill level, sex, race and country of residence.
It omits the role of nonmarket production and because of earning diﬀerences
by sex and race, it places a lower value on saving the lives of women and non
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whites than on saving the lives of adult white males. Moreover, the human
capital approach assigns zero value to people who are retired, handicapped
or totally disabled and to children (Landefeld and Seskin, 1982). Another
important objection is that the human capital approach is inconsistent with
the fundamental premise of welfare economics by which individuals’ prefer-
ences should constitute the cornerstone of the benefit-cost analysis(Cropper
and Oates, 1992).
Individuals make decisions everyday that reflect their preferences and how
they value health and mortality risks, such as driving an automobile, smoking
cigarettes or living in polluted areas. Many of these choices involve market
decisions. Using evidence on these market choices, which involve implicit
trade-oﬀs between risks and money, economists have developed estimates
of the individuals’ WTP to reduce risk of death. The willingness-to-pay
approach is based on the assumption that changes in individuals’ economic
welfare can be valued according to what individuals are willing (and able) to
pay to achieve that change. According to this assumption, individuals treat
longevity like other consumption good and reveal their preferences through
the choices that involve changes in the risk of death and other economic
goods whose values can be measured in monetary terms.
One of the most used approach to measuring willingness to pay to reduce
the risk of death is to infer the value from compensating wage diﬀerentials
in the labor market (see Viscusi and Aldy, 2003 for a complete treatment).
The theory behind this approach is simple:
[...The basic idea behind compensating wage diﬀerentials is
that jobs can be characterized by various attributes, including
risk of accidental death. Workers are described by the amount
they require as compensation for diﬀerent risk levels, while firms
are characterized by the amounts they are willing to oﬀer work-
ers to accept diﬀerent risk levels. The matching of wage oﬀers
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and acceptances determines the hedonic wage equation, which de-
scribes the compensation received for bearing risk in market equi-
librium...] (Simon et al., 1999)
Simon et al. (1999) express the individual’s willingness to substitute risk
for income in the labor market as the compensation C that he would require
to work at various risk levels, holding utility constant. Formally:
(1− ρ) (1− φ)U (C + I) = k (21)
where φ is the risk of death on the job, and ρ is the risk of dying from
all other causes while I denotes the non-labor income. The worker’s choice
of risk level, φ, occurs where a marginal change in required compensation,
C0(φ), equals a marginal change in the wage oﬀered in market equilibrium,
w0(φ), or, equivalently, where the compensation function is tangent to the
hedonic wage equation, w(φ). Equilibrium in the labor market is given by
the locus of tangency points between various required compensation and
oﬀer curves. This locus is the hedonic wage function, and its derivative with
respect to risk of death measures the value of a small change in risk to the
worker:
dw
dφ
=
(1− ρ)U (w + I)
(1− ρ) (1− φ)U 0 (w + I) = Vi (22)
Equation 22 gives the rate at which a worker is willing to substitute income
for risk
dw
dφ
that is equal to his expected utility if he survives risk of death
on the job, (1 − ρ)U 0(w + I), divided by his expected marginal utility of
income, (1− ρ) (1− φ)U 0 (w + I). Hence, equation 22 is a measure of the
risk premium that a worker receives to compensate him for risk of death on
job ( we label this relationship, Vi with reference to the equation 13). Then,
the compensating wage approach by providing a value Vi that is a measure
of individuals WTP to avoid death risks could be used in the equation 13 to
measure total change of the social value (dT ) of the health eﬀects due to the
change in environmental quality. Cropper and Freeman (1991) and Cropper
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and Oates (1992) stress that the compensating wage approach presents at
least three problems: the first problem concerns the fact that compensating
wage diﬀerentials exist only if workers are informed of job risks. A second
problem related to this approach is that compensating diﬀerentials seem to
exist only in unionized industries than it may provide estimates of the value
of a risk reduction only for certain segments of the population. Finally, if
workers have biased estimates of job risks market wage premium will yield
biased estimates of the value of a risk reduction.
Moreover, compensating wage diﬀerentials approach presents other im-
portant limitations. Firstly, it tends to focus on the value adults in the
prime of their life place on reducing their risk of dying, even though accord-
ing to the epidemiological literature, the significant correlation between air
pollutants and deaths occur among people over 65 (Ostro, 1994; Schwartz
and Dockery, 1992). In addition, this method tends to focus only on imme-
diate risk changes. However, when an environmental policy program reduces
exposure to a carcinogen, while the costs of doing so are often incurred in the
present, mortality risks are reduced in the future, following a latency period.
Diﬃculties in measuring the individual’s WTP using labor market com-
pensating wage approach and its limitations have led to the use of CV to
measuring willingness to pay. As we have already seen in the evaluation of
morbidity cases (section 1.2.1), CV presents great flexibility but also a num-
ber of limitations ( for a complete treatment of these problems see Diamond
and Hasuman, 1994).
3 Summary and Conclusions
There is a substantial amount of literature on theoretical and empirical as-
pects of the economic valuation of policies and instruments to improve envi-
ronmental quality and human health. Here, starting with Weitzman’s (1974)
seminal work, we have provided a short but comprehensive overview of key
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literature on the choices faced by policy makers concerning price-based versus
quantity-based instruments to regulate pollution and protect human health.
We have reviewed the methods employed in estimating pollution abatement
costs and pollution related health damages whose comparison (with reference
to Weitzman’s theoretical rule) should form the basis for the choices among
the price-based and quantity-based regulation instruments.
The aim of this paper is to shed light on the diﬃculties that analysts
face in estimating the value of pollution health damages or benefits from
reduced pollution. In fact, while measuring control costs seems relatively
straightforward, measuring and valuing the health impacts of pollution is a
very complex task: we have shown that the available methods of economic
analysis are often rudimentary and the answers vary greatly depending on
the method used. In recent years, however, considerable progress has been
made, especially with respect to air and water pollution.
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